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Climate Justice and the Elusive Climate Tort
The Supreme Court’s decision in American Electric Power Co. v. Connecticut 
(AEP)1 closes another door for those most vulnerable to climate change. The 
corrective justice goals of tort law and the associated possibilities for redress—
particularly vital to the most vulnerable—remain elusive due to the Court’s 
restricted view of tort law’s relevance to climate change. This Essay analyzes 
these climate justice implications of AEP.
The field of “climate justice” (CJ) is concerned with the intersection of race 
and/or indigeneity, poverty, and climate change. It also recognizes the direct 
kinship between social inequality and environmental degradation.2 The term 
“climate vulnerable,” the subject of CJ, describes those communities or nation-
states that have a particularly acute exposure to present and forecasted climatic 
changes. That increased vulnerability is due to either the nature and degree of 
climate impacts’ forecast and/or the preexisting socioeconomic vulnerabilities 
that climate impacts amplify.3 Underscoring the “justice” element, these most 
vulnerable populations are also the least responsible for the emissions that fuel 
anthropogenic climate change.
The Essay argues that the common law nuisance claims rejected by the 
Court in AEP provide an important mechanism for the climate vulnerable to 
achieve corrective justice. Corrective justice is one of the most important goals 
of tort law because of its focus on the relationship between the tortfeasor and 
victim. While there are myriad interpretations of corrective justice theory and 
1. 131 S. Ct. 2527 (2011).
2. See Maxine Burkett, Just Solutions to Climate Change: A Climate Justice Proposal for a Domestic 
Clean Development Mechanism, 56 BUFF. L. REV. 169, 193 (2008).
3. See Maxine Burkett, Climate Reparations, 10 MELB. J. INT’L L. 509, 513-14 (2009).
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its application,4 this approach at its core counsels simply that individuals who 
are responsible for the wrongful losses of others have a duty to repair those 
losses. Further, rectification of harms suffered can help restore the moral 
balance upset by the externalized costs that climate change inflicts on 
individuals and communities. The corollary, therefore, is that tort law should 
provide a venue and possible damages remedy for CJ plaintiffs whose claims—
namely, injuries to life and property—demand compensation from the worst 
offenders.
As Professor Osofsky explains in her commentary,5 the AEP Court 
explicitly endorses the regulatory route for addressing emissions that 
contribute to climate change, rather than providing a parallel track in the 
courts through injunction.6 Even if a regulatory regime could achieve 
emissions reductions objectives more effectively than tort law, however, CJ 
claimants have lost the ability to confront major emitters and gain redress for 
their particular—and disproportionate—injuries. So while tort law, and the 
accompanying judicial process, introduces the complex web of claims and 
potential defendants that Professor Gerrard describes,7 it also provides a 
unique way for CJ claimants to face major emitters, argue that they have been 
injured, and demonstrate that defendants have an obligation to make amends 
for that wrong.
Public nuisance theory, in particular, serves as a potentially effective 
corrective justice mechanism for CJ claimants because it focuses on the nature 
of the harms plaintiffs suffer. Native Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp.,8
another pending public nuisance case that faces an uphill battle after AEP, is a 
paradigmatic example of CJ by virtue of its plaintiffs and the nature of their 
claims. Plaintiffs seek monetary damages for the past and ongoing emissions of 
4. See generally Allan Beever, Corrective Justice and Personal Responsibility in Tort Law, 28
OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 475, 478-79 (2008) (describing theories of corrective justice).
5. See Hari M. Osofsky, AEP v. Connecticut’s Implications for the Future of Climate Change 
Litigation, 121 YALE L.J. ONLINE 101 (2011), http://yalelawjournal.org/2011/09/13/
osofsky.html.
6. See 131 S. Ct. at 2538.
7. See Michael B. Gerrard, What Litigation of a Climate Change Nuisance Suit Might
 Look Like, 121 YALE L.J. ONLINE 135 (2011), http://yalelawjournal.org/2011/09/13/
gerrard.html. I appreciate the admonition Professor Gerrard provides. I share some of his 
concerns, particularly regarding the time and administrative resources litigation would 
require. See Burkett, Climate Reparations, supra note 3.
8. 663 F. Supp. 2d 863, 873-76 (N.D. Cal. 2009), appeal docketed, No. 09-17490 (9th Cir. Nov. 
5, 2009).
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several major oil, coal, gas and utility companies.9 Kivalina has almost 400 
residents, 97 percent of whom are Alaska Natives. The village is traditional 
Inupiat and is located at the tip of a six-mile-long barrier reef. Plaintiffs allege 
that climate change has severely harmed Kivalina’s people and property by 
reducing the sea ice that acts as a protective barrier to coastal storms. The 
storms and waves are destroying the land with such severity that the entire 
community must now relocate further inland.10 Government estimates have 
determined that the cost of relocation falls between $95 million and $400 
million.11
The Inupiat are among the most vulnerable to climate change and yet have 
produced insignificant emissions. The current regulatory infrastructure for 
reducing emissions does not respond to the specific needs of these plaintiffs. 
For them, a viable tort claim is a means to achieve compensation for the loss of 
their property and to facilitate their relocation. Public nuisance theory, with its 
emphasis on the unreasonableness of a plaintiff’s injury, provides an 
appropriate focus for understanding climate impact claims. Instead of assessing 
the worth of a defendant’s actions—often riddled with the politics of wealth 
and power—nuisance law shines a spotlight on the unprecedented events 
climate change introduces. Public nuisance claims, as Professor Abate explains, 
may succeed where disparate impact litigation failed in the environmental 
justice context.12 They can provide the specific relief—funding for physical 
relocation in this case—that these particular CJ plaintiffs deserve. Even with a 
comprehensive regulatory scheme for emissions reduction in place, public 
nuisance law should remain a means by which climate-impacted communities 
can seek compensation from major emitters.
The decision in AEP forecloses federal common law public nuisance claims 
so long as the EPA retains regulatory authority over greenhouse gas 
emissions.13 The opinion further states that, even if the EPA decides not to 
regulate greenhouse gas emissions (or does so inadequately), the federal 
common law is not an available track to pursue such actions.14 That stance may 
negatively impact the ability for any court to address the individual claims 
9. Complaint for Damages and Demand for Jury Trial, Native Vill. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil 
Corp., No. 08-1138 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 26, 2008).
10. Id. at 46.
11. Id.
12. See Randall S. Abate, Public Nuisance Suits for the Climate Justice Movement: The Right Thing 
and the Right Time, 85 WASH. L. REV. 197, 243 (2010).
13. 131 S. Ct. at 2537.
14. Id. at 2538.
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based on specific harms brought by CJ plaintiffs—claims that are critical for 
achieving redress for these vulnerable communities.
The Court’s decision also betrays a skittishness in dealing with climate 
change suits generally, which underscores its failure to appreciate the deep 
injustices climate impacts introduce. Inexplicably, the AEP Court takes time in 
its relatively slender decision to inject doubt about elements of climate science. 
Abandoning the confidence demonstrated in Massachusetts v. EPA, the Court 
cites to a magazine article expressing doubt about climate change impacts as a 
counterweight to the voluminous peer-reviewed articles on which the EPA 
based its findings.15 Further, the Court pauses again to make a facile indictment 
of all breathing, sentient beings.16 In an instant, it dismisses the relative excess 
with which some have burned carbon for luxury and profit versus those who 
have for food and shelter.
This reluctance to address the justice elements of climate change is a legal 
phenomenon that exacerbates already dangerous climate effects. Over twenty 
years ago, David Caron explained that the law can create feedback loops that, 
like their counterparts in the physical world, amplify certain climate trends.17 A 
core purpose of law and the courts, particularly in a tort law context, is to 
provide recourse to those who have been wronged, especially if the wrongs 
involve the loss of life or property. If at every turn there is no avenue for 
remedy, the law and its institutions risk being perceived as an ineffective means 
to acknowledge and correct injustice—especially from the vantage point of the 
climate vulnerable. This denies the least responsible their day in court and 
further delays—if not, excludes—any possibility of being made whole.
Moving forward from the AEP decision, the lower courts have a choice 
about how they treat the unresolved alternative avenues for tort relief. If the 
lower courts make the distinction between the injunctive relief sought in AEP
and the compensatory relief sought in Kivalina and recognize the corrective 
potential of compensation claims and their role in administering the process, 
the disparately impacted may enjoy appropriate recourse. Opening their doors 
to climate tort claims would be the courts’ distinct contribution to what will 
hopefully be a diverse and multi-layered commitment to rectifying, at least in 
part, the losses of the climate vulnerable.
15. Id. at 2533 n.2 (citing Nicholas Dawidoff, The Civil Heretic, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 2009 
(Magazine), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/29/magazine/29Dyson-t.html).
16. See 131 S. Ct. at 2538 (“After all, we each emit carbon dioxide merely by breathing.”).
17. David D. Caron, When Law Makes Climate Change Worse: Rethinking the Law of Baselines in 
Light of a Rising Sea Level, 17 ECOLOGY L.Q. 621, 623 (1990).
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